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development of a hybrid regulatory approach to the promotion of CSR, which transcends the limitations of public and private international law in supply chain management.
II. CSR and Global Supply Chain Management: The Developing
Legal Framework
The CSR of TNCs is a much discussed topic due to frequent examples of irresponsible corporate conduct, particularly in global supply chains. 4 There is no agreed definition of CSR, partly due to the longstanding debate about whether or not CSR is purely voluntary or can also be mandatory. 5 Notably, in its 2011 communication on CSR, the European Commission adopted a new definition of CSR as 'the responsibility of enterprises for their impact on society'. 6 This definition supersedes the Commission's longstanding definition of CSR as 'voluntary' and suggests a more legal slant to CSR that potentially engages both public and private international law. 7 The new definition recognises that CSR can no longer be considered a purely voluntary nor a purely private law consideration because CSR and human rights law overlap in several ways. 
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Currently, legal approaches to CSR are widely discussed in the context of global supply chains. 9 This is due to recent examples of human rights violations that gained widespread media attention, including the Rana Plaza building collapse, the Tazreen factory fire and reports about forced labour in the Thai fishing industry and on cocoa farms in West Africa. 10 Another example is the smartphone industry, which is examined below. 11 The supply chain (sometimes referred to as the 'value chain') includes all the different parties that contribute to the product that is sold to the customer. 12 It therefore consists of the seller of the end product as well as the manufacturer, retailers, transporters and various sub-suppliers. 13 At the head of the global supply chain is often a Western TNC, ie corporations that 'are incorporated or unincorporated enterprises comprising parent enterprises and their foreign affiliates'. 14 Global supply chain operations often reach across multiple countries. The organisation of the supply chain is the domain of the supply chain management, which includes the planning and management of all sourcing, procurement and logistics activities. 15 It also includes coordination and collaboration 9 See, eg the recent legislation in this area, discussed below: California Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010 (US) and the UK Modern Slavery Act 2015 s54 on transparency in supply chains. 10 Many NGOs currently monitor and respond to the business impact on human rights, eg Business and Human Rights Resource Centre www.business-humanrights.org; CORE at www.corporate-responsibility.org/about-core. 14 This definition of transnational corporations is used by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, www.unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/Transnational-corporations-(TNC).aspx. Whilst some scholars use the term 'transnational corporation' others prefer referring to 'multinational enterprises'. There is no agreed definition of the term 'multinational enterprise'. The OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises state that a clear definition was not required for the purpose of the guidelines, but note the following characteristic features: 'They [multinational enterprises] usually comprise companies or other entities established in more than one country and so linked that they may coordinate their operations in various ways. While one or more of these entities may be able to exercise a significant influence over the activities of others, their degree of autonomy within the enterprise may vary widely from one multinational enterprise to another. Ownership may be private, State or mixed', see OECD, Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2011 edition) 17. (Hart 2018) with partners, particularly suppliers. Many examples of gross human rights violations occur in resource extraction projects and supplier factories at the bottom of global supply chains, which are usually based in developing countries. These suppliers are often subcontractors to subcontractors, far removed from the commissioning company at the top of the chain. 16 The public attention focused on human rights violations at supplier factories has made global supply chain management not just an issue of cost saving, but also a reputational concern. 17 'Responsible supply chain management' captures the notion that companies include CSR policies in their supply chain management. 18 Part of this responsible supply chain management is usually the development of a supplier code of conduct by TNCs which they incorporate into their supplier relationships, albeit in different ways and to varying legal effects. 19 These supplier codes of conduct usually impose a variety of socially responsible terms, such as the prohibition of forced labour or anti-bribery policies, on the supplier based on the focus of the TNC at the top of the supply chain.
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Critics argue that globalisation enables TNCs to not only diversify and outsource their production, but also their legal liability due to the disjointed relationship between public and private international law. 20 
A. TNCs and their Limited International Legal Personality
In the last half-century, the traditional public international legal system commenced a slow, but that would do just that. 56 Even with this recognition, public policy does not permit the international community to ignore certain realities when it comes to human rights and business. 57 Globalisation ensures connectivity across the planet by enabling communications, people and business activity to transcend even the most far-afield borders. The connection between human rights and business activity is raised increasingly in international forums. 58 These forums, particularly the UN, deliver a growing body of soft law designed to fill the gaps when harder forms of law, such as a human rights treaty, cannot be agreed or there is little will among states to codify new norms. 59 The following provides an overview of key soft law initiatives currently influencing the human rights and business discourse. offer a roadmap for delegating human rights responsibilities between government and business.
Together, the UN Framework and the UNGPs provide a common policy framework from a multi-stakeholder approach and key to three pillars-protect, respect and remedy-is the The fundamental problem with supply chain management is that traditionally it has been only the bottom line, the final costs that interest a TNC in a competitive global market.
Transparency, as set out in soft instruments of public international law, suggests that regulators, and ideally stakeholders, are able to trace every element of a product to its roots and that national laws will mandate social responsibility with the penalty that consumer choices will be altered in relation to the information available or TNCs will suffer business repercussions.
These repercussions may reveal themselves in cross-border disputes such as those in the 'foreign-cubed' situation introduced above. Are soft law initiatives simply too 'insufficiently compelling' in terms of real human rights protection? 72 As international discourse and practice continues to expand on these issues, the real test will be the ground level protection of human rights, not the professed uptake of these international soft law instruments. And while soft law may not be sufficiently compelling, it does highlight the tension between the public and private spheres in terms of human rights protection. This section will first analyse the applicable law in cases of human rights violations at supplier factories, then turn to the issue of jurisdiction before finally looking at the consequences of the legal structure within global supply chains.
IV. The Barriers in Private International

A. The Applicable Law
With regards to the applicable law, the general principle that is traditionally applied by most legal systems is the law of the place of the tort (lexi loci delicti In the European Union, the applicable law in claims based on tort law is determined by Forthcoming 2018) of the tort and the person sustaining damage both have their habitual residence in the same country at the time when the damage occurs the law of that country applies. Also, where the tort is manifestly more closely connected with a country other than the country in Article 4(1) or (2), then the law of the other country applies. 81 The challenge that this legal regime in tort law establishes is that the place where the damage occurs is 'narrowly circumscribed'. 82 Recital 17 of the Rome II Regulation establishes that for cases of personal injury 'the country in which the damage occurs should be the country where the injury was sustained.' 83 Therefore, the usual situation is that when the tort is committed outside the UK, the applicable law to decide about the merits of the claim for damages will be determined by the law of the place where the damage/injury occurred. In the context of human rights violations at supplier factories this will be the law of the country in which the supplier factory is based, for example Bangladesh. In many instances, the applicable law is not fully developed. Consequently, tort victims in global supply chains must base their claim on the law of the country where the damage/injury occurred. They will therefore not have access to English tort law, which is well-developed, for example, in terms of law relating to workplace injuries. The rules of the Rome II Regulation therefore severely restrict the ability to apply English tort law extraterritorially to human rights violations at overseas factories which supply goods for transnational corporations in the United Kingdom. 
B. Rules of Jurisdiction
Although English tort law is unlikely to be applied to torts that occur at supplier factories far down the supply chain, the chances for the victims of those human rights violations to be awarded compensation might still be better if English courts have jurisdiction to hear the claim.
As noted in the previous section, the law applicable to the case may be the law of the country where the tort occurred. Usually the place where the tort occurred, or where the damage occurred, are also connecting factors for the purposes of jurisdiction, ie they constitute 'bases of jurisdiction'. However, given the difficulty in gaining access to courts in many developing 84 
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The analysis that follows, however, is solely based on the application of the Brussels regime, and within this regime, it only analyses the possibilities that this regime presents for bringing the claim before the English courts, rather than a fuller analysis of all the bases of jurisdiction provided for in the Brussels regime for this kind of claims.
Article 4 of the Brussels I bis Regulation stipulates that persons who are domiciled in a Member State shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that Member State.
Domicile for a company is defined by Article 63(1) of the Regulation as the place where the company has its statutory seat, its central administration or its principal place of business. In
Article 63(2) it is clarified that in the UK statutory seat means the place where the company has its registered office or, where there is no such office, the place of incorporation or, where is no such place anywhere, the place under the law of which the formation took place. This rule means that companies incorporated in the UK and/or companies that are effectively run from the UK are to be sued in UK courts. As a consequence of this rule, a foreign subsidiary of a UK transnational corporation will usually not satisfy these requirements and can, therefore, not be sued in English courts based on domicile as a connecting factor. The legal regime established by the Brussels Regulation therefore means that companies that are domiciled in the UK can be sued here, even for conduct that they have done elsewhere. Under the Brussels regime, English courts are not able to stay proceedings on grounds of forum non conveniens. 90 However, courts are able to stay the proceedings in cases where proceedings are pending before a court of a third state at the time when a court in a Member State is seized of an action involving the same cause of action and between the same parties as the proceedings in the court of the third state. 91 The condition for a stay of proceedings in this situation is that 90 See discussion in the chapter by French and Ruiz Abou-Nigm in this volume.
91 Brussels I bis, art 33(1). satisfied that a stay is necessary for the proper administration of justice. It has been pointed out that companies as potential defendants of lawsuits in the UK might 'commence proceedings for a declaration of non-liability in the host jurisdiction'. 92 Baughen notes that due to Article 33 of Brussels I bis companies are able to ask the court in the UK to exercise its discretion to stay the proceedings based on the fact that they had already commenced proceedings about the same cause of action in a third state (ie, a non-Member State of the EU). Given that it is already difficult to bring a claim against a UK TNC for torts occurring at its supplier factories, this rule restricts those circumstances even further.
Overall, the rules in Brussels I bis severely limit the ability of victims of human rights violations at supplier factories to have their tort claims heard at English courts. In most cases, the company that owned the factory where the violation occurred will not be the TNC based in the UK, but a foreign company, either a foreign subsidiary, owned by the UK TNC or a foreign supplier which is completely independent. The jurisdiction for lawsuits against foreign companies, however, lies with the foreign courts where these companies are domiciled as there is no sufficient connection with the UK. Yet, with regards to claims that can be brought against between the different companies in the group, even in case of a wholly-owned subsidiary. The consequence of this approach is that the TNC as the parent company will not be vicariously liable for the torts committed by its subsidiaries. English law strictly treats parent and subsidiary companies as separate legal entities. The parent company is therefore effectively protected from liability. The only way to make the parent company legally liable in tort law is to establish that it has itself breached a duty of care that it directly owed to the employees of its subsidiaries.
Second, the structure of global production processes has shifted from the traditional parent-overseas subsidiary company situation to a chain of suppliers and sub-suppliers, which loose structure consisting of wholly independent companies exacerbates the situation from the point of view of providing access to justice for the victims of violations of CSR principles. The rules of private international law, discussed above, will make it difficult to apply English law to such scenarios or for English courts to assume jurisdiction to hear those claims. The law is therefore struggling to catch up with the business realities. 99 Still, the situation for tort law and contract law differs: whereas current private international law regulation in the EU acts as a barrier to promoting greater corporate social responsibility in global supply chains in tort law, it acts as a facilitator with regards to contract law. However, as the victims of violations of CSR principles at supplier factories do not procure a remedy in contract against the transnational corporation through contractual CSR clauses, the effect of this difference is likely to be limited. 100 The reason is that the enforcement of the contractual CSR obligations imposed on suppliers depends on the transnational corporations themselves.
E. Summary: The Barriers to Promoting CSR Posed by EU Private International Law Rules
In summary, the European private international law regime is not very conducive to promoting transnational human rights in litigation based on tort law. Jurisdiction and applicable law rules 99 Despite the focus of this chapter on English law, it is worth mentioning here that, at the time of writing, there is an ongoing case at the Regional Court of Dortmund against the German textile discounter KIK (Jabir u a / KiK Textilien und Non-Food GmbH, LG Dortmund, 7 O 95/15). The company is being sued by the relatives of victims of a factory fire at a Pakistan textile factory. The claim is based on tort law. In this case, the supplier company that ran the factory is not owned by KIK and is therefore not a subsidiary company. However, as KIK was the main buyer from that factory, the claimants' lawyers argue that KIK had joint legal responsibility for the fire and would therefore have to compensate the relatives. The outcome of this decision might start an interesting discussion about the legal responsibility of transnational corporations for the violation of CSR principles at supplier factories. 2018) in the EU regime severely restrict the extraterritorial application of English tort law in respect of violations of CSR occurred abroad. In consequence, victims of CSR violations at supplier factories overseas have to try and get justice in their own countries. Whilst it can be argued that this approach conforms to the territoriality principle of law, it also means that, in practice, the access to justice for the victims of harmful corporate conduct is often limited.
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In the absence of a binding international human rights framework on corporations, the consequence of this restrictive approach towards extraterritoriality means that the transnational corporations at the head of the supply chain can operate with significant legal impunity.
Consequently, products that are tainted by modern slavery, for example, are often sold without anyone being held liable for this gross human rights abuse. Private international law in its
European context therefore falls short of providing effective access to justice, which is, after all, a key principle of the UNGPs that have been adopted by both the European Union and the UK. 101 Civil litigation against transnational corporations for torts in their supply chain therefore faces both serious procedural (private international law rules) as well as structural (corporate structures within groups of companies and networks of suppliers) barriers. 102 And as noted the systemic territorial principle of public international law reinforces and sustains the juridical divisions. These barriers are evident in the case study of the mobile phone industry discussed in the next section.
V. Case Study of the Mobile Phone Industry
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In most cities and towns, locating an individual without a smart phone is by far rarer than the sighting of a smartphone. Smartphones increasingly are integrated into the daily lives of people from every socio-economic background, transcending commonplace economic identifiers associated with poverty. In 2015, 1,423.9 million smartphones were sold worldwide and it is anticipated that this number will rise to over 1,800 million by 2020. 103 In light of the decreasing average price of a smartphone, 104 use of these technological gadgets is becoming more commonplace than not in the West. Rarely, however, is a thought given to the way in which these devices appear in their perfectly designed packages at every other storefront on high streets across the West.
Looking at the resourcing of materials used to create smartphones and the workforce used to assemble them, it is clear that responsible supply chain management has not been the forefront consideration for most of the world's leading brands. Examining the supply chain for smartphones presents a range of CSR red flags: the use of conflict minerals, poor workplace conditions, substandard wages, the use of child labour and e-waste return to developing states are just a few of the issues easily identified.
Since its inception, the smartphone industry has been dominated by a handful of manufacturer/suppliers, including Nokia, Motorola and Apple. 105 Continued success in the markets has been sustained by cost reduction strategies, which inevitably means the movement of manufacturing operations to the developing world. 106 Developing countries often suffer from they otherwise would be left without an avenue along which they might pursue justice.
However, this alone will not fully repair the current problems with human rights accountability.
National courts are not guaranteed to deliver a universal interpretation of human rights. 119 This is particularly true due to the reinterpretation of human rights violations as private law claims.
Commentators have suggested that approaches not employing the language of human rights, a civil tort suit for example, do not fulfil the object of human rights law. 120 This chapter asserts otherwise. Whether under the guise of criminal, tort or some other legal designation, the key must be that individual victims of human rights abuse get access to justice. Streamlining all cases as human rights law breaches is the ideal, but should not any step forward be viewed as progress?
Given the significant obstacles to the promotion of CSR in supply chains in both public and private international law, it is important to develop a framework that overcomes the barriers discussed so far. To that end, we propose a hybrid regulatory system that transcends the limits of private and public international law approach and which will, consequently, help reconcile CSR and supply chain management. 121 In our proposed hybrid approach, different regulatory instruments would work together, including hard law, soft law, public international law, private international law and domestic law. It is argued that due to the myriad of challenges facing responsible supply chain management, it is necessary to rely upon a variety of different regulatory instruments. Both public and private international law present different hurdles for promoting CSR in global supply chains, particularly due to the way extraterritoriality is approached and due to the legal position and structures of the TNCs in those supply chains. 
A. The Strategic Use of Home State Regulation
Whilst it is admitted that the international regulation of transnational corporations would have the potential to achieve a more consistent and more coherent approach, no such framework is expected anytime soon. In the absence of such an international approach, small steps of addressing corporate power in the home state can achieve incremental change that leads toward reconciliation of human rights and supply chain management. This would prevent TNCs from merely paying lip-service to CSR, but rather push them to fully integrate CSR into their management strategies. The creative use of home state regulation can help fill the regulatory gaps that global supply chains exhibit in terms of human rights protection. The hybrid approach that we propose is capable of overcoming the three main challenges of the present situation that we identified above: first, the limitations that the absence of binding international human rights duties on corporations; second, the barriers towards extraterritorial civil litigation in the European private international law framework; third, the difficulty of holding transnational corporations vicariously liable in tort for the unlawful conduct of their subsidiaries or their suppliers.
The strategic use of domestic law can particularly rely on corporate criminal law and transparency regulations. The former assertion is based on the model set out in the UK Bribery due diligence is the 'carrot'. It could therefore steer corporate behaviour away from the current voluntary and haphazard approach to CSR toward a more consistent, integrated CSR compliance system within a broader responsible supply chain management plan. CSR due diligence is thereby given a more prominent position than it currently has in many corporations.
At the moment, TNCs often send mixed messages about their approach to CSR to suppliers.
Whereas the purchase department often pushes for short-term and low-cost production, CSR department policies are seen as an additional burden on suppliers. 130 However, the law needs to ensure that companies integrate CSR into their entire supply chain management and do not treat it as an 'add on'.
The proposed model gives CSR a more prominent standing than it has at present. This approach could overcome the limitations of public and private international law that contribute to the current neglect of CSR in supply chain management. further example of when the English courts could extraterritorial jurisdiction. There are currently few instances where a state is able to exercise jurisdiction for activity outside the normal territorial limits of its jurisdiction without domestic law specifically crafted to override the extraterritoriality limitations recognised by both public and private international law.
B. Steps Toward the Hybrid Regulatory Approach
Ultimately, the best approach to reconciling human rights and supply chain management would be a private international law instrument that could effectively deliver a process for dealing with 'foreign-cubed' claims by clarifying options of choice of law and forum. Until that time, the following briefly outlines our views for a hybrid regulatory approach that will strengthen CSR in global supply chains.
Step one is for home states to implement strict domestic transparency regulation for all TNCs operating outwith the home state. Such transparency regulation must include broad coverage of different types of business actors and mandate reporting in respect to all levels of the supply chain, including the most far-removed supplier.
Stricter transparency regulation should also demand a well-defined design, featuring differentiated, clear and measurable reporting requirements and, in particular, binding reporting about the TNC's due diligence mechanisms, external audits of its supply chain and facts and figures about human rights violations in its supply chain that were detected.
Step two sees the home state imposing a due diligence obligation on all TNCs to protect against human rights abuse at every level of operation and a corresponding right to access remedy in the home state for victims when due diligence failures result in extraterritorial human rights abuse, reflecting international human rights law. Tracking the UN Framework approach to remedy, this could include administrative procedures or other non-judicial procedures in addition to tort liability. Equally, the failure of due diligence mechanisms could lead to criminal liability, such as in the Bribery Act model. In any case, what is important is that TNCs must no longer be able to avoid liability by purely paying lip-service to due diligence mechanisms without having a coherent and meaningful approach to supply chain due diligence that would significantly reduce the risk of human rights violations in their supply chain. Thus, step two sees public international law norms informing private law claims in the home state.
Step three concerns the actions that TNCs take on the basis of the legal environment created by more stringent transparency regulation, due diligence obligations and corresponding liability potential in their home states. TNCs will need to react to new legal requirements, particularly by establishing supply chain due diligence. TNCs can choose how to meet the requirements of the home state laws, for example, how to incorporate CSR policies into their private supplier relationships (eg in supply chain contracts) and which due diligence procedures to impose on their suppliers. The third step therefore further entrenches the public-private link upon which our hybrid model is built. TNCs can, for instance, choose to incorporate public international soft law standards on CSR issues such as the UN Framework. These non-binding instruments then become binding between the TNCs and their suppliers through the power of contract law. Thus, the hybrid approach builds upon existing opportunities in domestic law to allow public international law to inform regulatory choices and responses thereto.
VII. Conclusion
Global supply chains have become synonymous with human rights violations. It is apparent that the CSR policies of TNCs have made few improvements in the working conditions in many supplier factories at the bottom of global supply chains. This is due to a number of legal challenges inherent in regulating such chains. Our chapter has sought to outline a legal framework designed to push for improvement of the all-too-often ineffective CSR instruments in the supply chain management of TNCs.
To that end, the chapter demonstrated that currently public and private international law neither jointly or separately deliver the magic formula in terms of reconciling human rights and supply chain management. Strong, directed cross-border regulation building on existing domestic private law and softer public international law instruments, such as the UNGPs, could overcome some of the barriers identified above. Strengthening transparency regulation does little to serve the immediate interests of victims of human rights violations thus we further outlined the need for clear avenues for access to justice for due diligence failures by TNCs.
Upon reflection and multiple iterations of our options, it is clear that further refined private international law rules, tailored to tackle the challenges posed by supply chain management in cross-border cases, could aid promoting CSR via both choice of law rules as well as providing for more adequate bases of jurisdiction in order to provide a better chance for victims to access justice. As set out at the beginning of this chapter, it is the victims that have fallen through the cracks in the law generated by the boundaries of existing public and private international law frameworks. Ultimately, it will take bold legal solutions to redress the current inadequacies of CSR in supply chain management. This chapter has outlined short turnaround approaches based on stronger home state transparency and due diligence regulation. We recognise, however, that ultimately, only a new subject-specific private international law instrument has the potential to overcome the existing public and private international law boundaries and ensure effective CSR and responsible supply chain management that respects and protects human rights.
